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Abstract 
 
This article explores the emotional impact on the viewer 
of disturbing and disorienting images of infant-caregiver 
relationality in four “melo-horror” films: Imitation of 
Life (1934), Imitation of Life (1959), The Brood (1979) 
and Beloved (1998). Comparing some of these filmic images 
to the infant performances of “disorganized” attachment 
styles captured on videotape by attachment researchers 
such as Mary Main, the author argues that the filmed 
audio-visual enactment of relational trauma, whether in 
the context of scientific research or cinematic art, 
offers the spectator an opportunity to work consciously 
and unconsciously with representations of unbearable 
psychic and psycho-social experience – both her own and 
that of others – which may hitherto have been thought un-
representable, or simply not thought at all. 
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I raised the camera, pretended to study a focus which did not include 
them, and waited and watched closely, sure that I would finally catch 
the revealing expression, one that would sum it all up, life that is 
rhythmed by movement but which a stiff image destroys, taking time in 
cross-section, if we do not choose the essential, imperceptible 
fraction of it.  
 
- Julio Cortázar, “Blow-Up”/”The Devil’s Drool” 
 
 
Why couldn’t they see it? It still puzzles me. 
 
- Frances Farmer, “God dies” 
 
 
 
I. 
 
They say that on the day of Melanie Klein’s funeral in 
1960, Klein’s long-estranged daughter, Melitta 
Schmideberg, based in New York since 1945 but back in 
England hard upon her mother’s death, did not attend the 
cremation in north London, but instead opted to give a 
 4 
lecture elsewhere in the capital. That day, it is 
reported, Schmideberg wore a pair of “flamboyant red 
boots” (Grosskurth, 1986, p. 461). The image of the 
unreconciled (and already obscure) psychoanalyst-daughter 
lecturing in her “special pair of red boots” (Young, 
2000) as her famous former analyst-mother’s body burned a 
few miles away has always split me in at least two parts: 
yanked in one direction by the almost comedic aspects of 
its sheer incongruity, I am pulled in quite another by 
the painful familial disintegration of which it so 
crazily speaks. In the context of this essay on cinema, 
Schmideberg’s red boots link in my projecting mind to 
analogous images from a particular kind of fantastically 
family-focused cinema and, like those filmic images, play 
an important part in my evolving internal representation 
of relational catastrophe.
1
 This article is concerned 
                                                        
1
 I think of Judy Garland’s ruby slippers and their spectacular 
intervention in her dangerous family romance in The Wizard of Oz 
(1939); Moira Shearer, psychotically dancing her way out of 
relationality in the demented Red Shoes (1948); and Piper Laurie in 
de Palma’s Carrie (1976), gasping in horror at the sight of her 
rebellious daughter’s (pale pink) prom dress: “Red! I might have 
known it would be red!” Then there is James Dean’s bright red jacket 
in Nicholas Ray’s 1955 melodrama Rebel without a Cause, its anti-
parental redness echoed in the nearly-sacrificed son’s jacket in 
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with the capacity of a certain kind of moving image to 
reflect aspects of the unprocessed affect of irreparably 
traumatized attachments. I shall be examining the 
function of images that have imprinted themselves on my 
psyche in the course of my 20-year relationship with some 
outlandish variants of North American family film 
melodrama. Schmideberg’s vividly recalled footwear on 
that day in 1960 seems to me to march straight out of a 
world of “melo-horror”, an icon of relational breakdown 
at the heart of the very parent-child dyad that 
generated, via Klein’s simultaneous blindness and 
insight, some of psychoanalysis’s most inspiring and 
deranged formulations.
2
 I want to argue that one of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Ray’s Bigger than Life (1956) and in the dead daughter’s – and the 
murderous dwarf’s – cloak in Roeg’s aptly-titled Don’t Look Now 
(1973).  
2
 Witnesses of Schmideberg’s public ravaging of her mother during the 
first phase of the so-called “controversial discussions” with Anna 
Freud in London in the early 1940s are divided into those (encouraged 
by Schmideberg’s analyst Edward Glover) who criticized Klein as an 
unscrupulous mother and analyst, those (mainly from Klein’s group) 
who viewed Schmideberg as either “a devil” or “ill”, and those who 
preferred to avert their eyes from the embarrassingly “un-English” 
spectacle (see Roazen, 2000, pp. 52-60; Kristeva, 2001, pp. 204-207; 
Grosskurth, 1986, pp. 281-333). The disturbing sight of whatever it 
was that had gone so terribly wrong between mother and daughter was 
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key – and hitherto little-discussed – functions of 
cinematic “melo-horror” is to capture on camera precisely 
such forms of ungraspably traumatized kinship.  
Inspired by a recent article by Robbie Duschinsky 
(2015) on the implications for film and media studies of 
attachment theory post-Bowlby, I have been moved to play 
with Duschinsky’s innovative marriage of object-related 
enquiry and analysis of the the moving image. 
Duschinsky’s piece forms part of a recent movement in 
film studies away from Lacan/“Screen Theory”, considering 
the film viewer’s experience in the context of play, 
emotion, obsession, relationality, internal metamorphosis 
and transitional phenomena (cf. Cartwright, 2008, Lebeau, 
2009 and Kuhn, 2013). In his article, Duschinsky explores 
not only the conservative but also the potentially 
radical use we can make of audio-visual information 
gleaned from the video recordings of infants and their 
caregivers that were created in the attempt to extend and 
                                                                                                                                                               
mercifully taken off-stage come 1945, but the image of those 
returning red boots carries the visual trace of an anti-relationality 
that begged to remain hidden. For a direct flavour of Schmideberg’s 
extraordinary critique of Klein during the controversial discussions 
themselves, see King and Steiner, 1991, e.g. pp. 92-99.  
 7 
develop Bowlby’s early concepts of human attachment.3 
When Mary Ainsworth carried out her series of experiments 
that have come to be known as the “strange situation”, 
she inaugurated a sustained meditation on the 
implications of really looking at the filmed images of 
children’s sometimes bewildering responses to their 
returning caregiver.  
Ainsworth’s analysis of these infants’ filmed 
demonstrations of indifference, relief or tearful 
resentment upon reunion with the parent or equivalent led 
to her establishment of the first three categories of 
“attachment style”: (a) insecure-avoidant, (b) secure and 
(c) insecure-ambivalent.
4
 In observing the recorded 
gestures of infants vis-à-vis their primary objects, 
Ainsworth was able to translate fragments of a parent-
child relationship that hitherto had remained mysterious 
and un-systematized into clear and communicable concepts. 
The videotaped “strange situation” staged a two-tiered 
relay of psycho-visual communication: allowing un-
                                                        
3
 It strikes me now that Bowlby, as Klein’s dissenting supervisee and 
Joan Rivière’s ex-patient, could be considered, along with Melitta 
Schmideberg, as another rebellious analyst “baby”. 
 
4
 For a good account of the “strange situation” and Ainsworth’s 
findings, see Wallin, 2007, pp. 15-24. 
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symbolized relationality to be transformed into 
observable gesture (by the demonstrating child), that 
observable gesture could later be transformed into 
meaning (by the theorizing researcher). When Ainsworth’s 
former doctoral student Mary Main added her own fourth 
category of “disorganized-disoriented” to Ainsworth’s 
already established three attachment styles, she pushed 
the researcher-spectator’s imperative to really look 
further still.
5
 Associated with severe trauma, with the 
caregiver’s failure to mourn their own lost objects, with 
neglect and/or abuse in the home, and evocative of a 
caregiver who is experienced by the infant as either 
“frightened” or “frightening”, the filmed infants 
eventually placed by Main into this final, controversial 
category rendered alarmingly audible and visible “a 
contradiction between the attachment system and another 
                                                        
5
 For a thorough overview of Main’s remarkable contribution, see 
Wallin, 2007, pp. 25-43. Main and Solomon (1990) remind us of the 
fundamental necessity of adequate vision when scrutinizing images for 
evidence of attachment styles: “If the film is of poor quality […] it 
is unlikely that D [disorganized-disoriented] scoring will be 
accurate […] The observation and recording of D behavior can only be 
made in conjunction with repeated, slow-motion study of the film” (p. 
147). This reminder is central to Duschinsky’s (2015) analysis. 
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behavioural tendency” (Duschinsky, 2015), performing 
oddly anomalous gestures and sounds: 
 
Directly upon sighting (or even hearing) the approach of the 
parent, some infants exhibited confusion. We observed one 
infant hunch her upper body and shoulders at hearing her 
mother’s call, then break into extravagant laugh-like screeches 
with an excited forward movement. Her braying laughter became a 
cry and distress-face without a new intake of breath as she 
hunched further forward. Then, suddenly, her face lost all 
expression (Main and Solomon, 1990, p. 146).  
 
Disorganized-disoriented attachment styles are 
characterized by the infant’s often unreadable audio-
visual displays of something that is, relationally-
speaking, out of joint; an energy – I am tempted to call 
it anti-energy – that seems to be flowing, or jerking, in 
almost otherworldly directions.
6
 The signs of 
disorganized-disoriented attachment are, above all, the 
visual communication (freezing, barking, falling) of a 
fantastically chaotic relationality. Main elaborates 
(Duschinsky, 2015) on the sheer disorder – captured by 
the powerful eye of the camera – of the physiognomic 
                                                        
6
 Main and Hesse (1990) write of “movements of approach which have a 
slow, limp, ‘underwater’ quality” (p. 173) and of unusual vocal 
patterns with “an ominous, or ‘haunted’ tone or effect” (p. 175). 
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manifestations of infants she and her colleagues found 
themselves scrutinizing and struggling to interpret:  
 
[F]or about three seconds one side of the child’s mouth turns 
upwards to form a smile while the other side turns down in a 
grimace or frown. Try doing it. It’s neurologically anomalous. 
I can’t do it. It suggests simultaneous activation of 
conflicting behavioral systems and without slow motion we would 
not have caught it. 
 
I am fascinated by the “strange situation” 
videotapes for the way in which they might also be 
viewed, from a non-scientific perspective, as the distant 
cousins of more widely-seen forms of filmed 
relationality: cinematic melodrama and cinematic horror. 
Blank, freezing or inconceivably splitting children 
appear on screen; something uncontainable gets performed 
by them before the camera’s gaze; and something 
emotionally real is glimpsed, felt and, perhaps, 
converted into meaning by the one who really looks. The 
three or four moving pictures I propose to discuss in 
what remains of this article are, for me, important 
examples of an uncanny, uncategorizable, disorganized, 
disoriented and disorienting hybrid cinematic genre I 
call “melo-horror”. In their fantastically visual 
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externalizations of traumatically internalized 
relationships, these films have demanded of me over the 
years that I look at them again and again, while at the 
same time confronting me with images of such remarkable 
disjunction that they feel often unbearable to witness. 
The Brood (1979), Beloved (1998) and the 1934 and 1959 
versions of Imitation of Life have propelled me towards 
new forms of knowledge about film, its depictions of 
disturbed kinship, and my own uncanny relation to its 
representations of what I would call disorganized 
revelation. At the heart of all of these films are the 
horrific performances of children who behave like living-
dead creatures when placed in proximity to their onscreen 
caregivers. These children “act out”, on the one hand, 
the gestures of desperation for a life-giving parental 
gaze while, on the other, appearing to suffer from having 
been placed in a context of constant, cinematic over-
scrutiny. Jerking, like Main’s videotaped infants in 
particular, and like my fantasy of Schmideberg’s red-
booted, counter-Kleinian, vengeful  daughter-analyst, in 
two or more directions at one and the same time, they 
threaten to pull apart the (often over-determinedly) 
psychoanalytic narratives in which they exist; the films 
shudder under the impact of their raging child-
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protagonists’ disoriented motions. This article is an 
attempt to analyse my own – disorganized – spectatorial 
attachment to these spectacles of infantile writhing.   
 
 
II. 
 
There is a moment in John Stahl’s 1934 film adaptation of 
Fannie Hurst’s 1933 novel Imitation of Life when Delilah, 
the Black mother of 18-year old Peola, who is “light-
skinned” enough to pass as White and informs her mother 
that she wishes now officially to do so, exclaims in a 
statement of bewildered anguish: “You can’t ask me to 
unborn my own child!” The line is a disturbing one which 
brings for the first time into (innovative) language an 
emotional truth about the radically unstable 
relationality which she and Peola have visibly inhabited 
since their appearance in the film’s first five minutes. 
Exhibiting a strange kinship with Jung’s description 
(uttered a year later in 1935, during his third lecture 
at the Tavistock Clinic in London) of the patient who had 
“never been properly born” – a phrase that would haunt 
Samuel Beckett, in attendance that day with his therapist 
Wilfred Bion (Connor, 1998) – Delilah’s exclamation 
evokes a psychically real but physically impossible 
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image, of a person who is somehow managing to reverse, 
undo or subvert the very process of their own birth to a 
particular mother, railing against the attachment with a 
force that is as palpable as it is fantastical. We are 
beyond the realm of mere family romance. 
 While the two films differ from one another in 
important ways which have been discussed at length 
elsewhere,
7
 they share a crucial quality which underpins, 
I think, my own long-term attachment to them both, and 
that is their deranged and deranging mimesis of Peola’s 
(re-named Sarah Jane in Sirk’s 1959 remake) internal 
split. Both film versions seem to jerk and writhe under 
the weight of the un-metabolized – and, crucially, 
disavowed – trauma and tension their double-narrative 
asks them to bear. The digestible “White story”, of 
comfortably neurotic mother-daughter duo Bea (re-named 
Lora) and Jessie (re-named Susie) and the indigestible 
“Black story” of Delilah (re-named Annie) and Peola/Sarah 
Jane, although housed in the same domestic space of the 
White woman’s apartment (later mansion), cannot be 
reconciled with one another, strain against one another, 
                                                        
7
 See, for example, Berlant (1993), Butler (1990) and Mulvey (1996), 
not to mention the extremely solid collection of essays on Sirk’s 
remake put together by Fischer (1991). 
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yanking the spectator in two fundamentally opposing 
emotional directions, for all the superficial similarity 
of the “mothers and daughters in conflict” trope. It is 
as if two different kinds of souls were contained within 
the same film-body. Peola/Sarah Jane and her outlandish 
demand to be “unborn” instils at the heart of both 
Imitations of Life a “realness” that feels both gory and, 
at times, un-survivable. This child’s words, expressions 
and gestures demand a new classification, transforming 
melodrama into melo-horror.   
The uncanniness of both versions of Imitation of 
Life lies in the way they imbricate this difficulty of 
really seeing what takes place within the Black mother-
daughter relationship, in all its disorienting horror, 
into the partially-blank gazes of the normative and self-
deceiving White mothers within the films’ narratives. In 
their White-mother roles, both Claudette Colbert and Lana 
Turner perform to perfection an anxious turning away from 
the disturbing, half-moving image of trauma provided by 
Peola/Sarah Jane. They constantly misread that 
bewildering figure’s writhing as something that is merely 
unfortunate, temporary, apolitical – and essentially 
reparable. In the 1934 version, having witnessed a 
particularly appalling interaction between Delilah and 
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Peola as they move ever closer to permanent familial 
rupture, a hand-wringing Bea will describe the situation 
to Jessie as “a tragedy”, an example of what she and 
Jessie must do their best to avoid. Bea is, as Mulvey 
(1996) puts it, “an encapsulation of disavowal” (p. 35), 
while, in the 1958 version, Lora is equally “unable to 
discern, to make out the emotional events that are taking 
place around her” (p. 38). But the films themselves 
operate in such a way that the spectator is hard pressed 
to take refuge in the same forms of defensive denial as 
those indulged in by their blank-White mothers. For in 
these films, Peola/Sarah Jane, together with her 
disturbing signs and gestures, are preserved as properly 
spectral, impossible for the spectator to normalize or 
shelve. Like the very trauma they communicate, the half-
moving images of Peola/Sarah Jane stick. Monique Rooney 
(2010) reminds us that         
 
in the interview with Jon Halliday in which he discusses 
Imitation’s twin plots, Sirk disparages the “white” storyline, 
the one that features the film’s star. […] Elsewhere, Sirk 
insists it is only this “split” character type [of Sarah Jane] 
that interests him. Sirk enigmatically states that it is the 
“restless, moving energy” of this figure that captures his 
attention and is central to his cinema dramas.  
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And in Mulvey’s (1996) terms, the figure of Sarah Jane 
contained “the element of craziness that Sirk valued” (p. 
31).  
This mad daughter figure is filmed in such a way 
that aspects of an unshakable relational malaise have 
become not only visible but also emotionally useful, in a 
highly complex manner, for a range of different 
spectators. Perez (2008) movingly and amusingly describes 
his long-term attachment to both versions of Imitation of 
Life and, in particular, to the “mulata” icon of 
Peola/Sarah Jane: “Imitation of Life is the cultural 
artifact that has chosen me — named me — inspiring trauma 
and reverie” (p. 119). Perez is especially compelling in 
his articulation of a troubling split at the heart of his 
relationship with the films’ images: 
 
I lay in bed, head aching, stunned that I had been reduced to 
convulsive sobs by a movie with such racist (and formulaic) 
machinations — a movie I found entirely transparent, or so I 
thought. I would return to this film, and its more famous 
remake, repeatedly as a teacher, race scholar, and queer fan. 
These repeated returns added to my pain and anger, but they 
also reinforced the more ineluctable pleasures for me of 
Imitation of Life. My difficulty in deciphering that pleasure, 
my inability to compartmentalize it, compels an incessant 
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return to the source (p. 120).     
 
Like Peola/Sarah Jane herself, then, Perez-as-spectator 
becomes divided against himself, torn in two directions, 
forced to look at implications of a disorganized-
disorientated attachment that is played out onscreen but 
is also repeated within him via his simultaneous 
repugnance for and attraction towards his hated-desired 
filmic object. Eventually admitting that, “[a]lienated by 
Peola’s articulated desire for whiteness, I nonetheless 
join her in seeking the protection, reputation, and 
privileges of whiteness”, Perez goes on to note: 
 
[t]he substance of Peola’s desire is not so alien after all — 
and this realization is a difficult one, especially as our need 
to murder the mother, whom we hold responsible for our shame, 
becomes clearer (p. 133). 
 
Rather than blanking it out like Bea or Lora, Perez uses 
the disturbing vision of Peola’s disoriented relationship 
with her mother to gain articulable insight into his own 
emotionally and ethico-politically disturbing experience 
of internal paradox. While Perez’s analysis focuses on 
the specificities of queer-of-colour identification with 
the image of Peola/Sarah Jane, what his exploration most 
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fascinatingly teases out is the cinematic figure’s power 
to symbolize unpalatable aspects of the spectator’s 
unconscious phantasies of a parent-child attachment gone 
nightmarishly wrong.  
The two versions of Imitation of Life are, from 
their very opening scenes, obsessed with the staging and 
filming of parent-child “strange situations” that either 
flirt with, or wander wholesale into, catastrophe. We are 
drawn into powerfully primitive images of early, 
repressed aspects of real or phantasized traumatic 
relationality. Via the uncompromising, exhibitionistic, 
frighteningly beautiful, at times (especially in Stahl’s 
version) deathly figure of Peola/Sarah Jane, then, the 
spectator is forced to gaze upon spectacular forms of 
disorientation that end up terrorizing and hijacking both 
films.
8
 I am reminded of the psychoanalytic biographer 
Paul Roazen (2000), recalling with barely concealed 
                                                        
8
 Fredi Washington’s performance as Peola in the 1934 version is 
nothing less than horrific, capturing with astonishing acuity the 
specifically ghoulish aspects of the girl’s internal deadness. As 
Sarah Jane in Sirk’s 1959 remake, Susan Kohner is far more erotically 
charged, while still communicating panic and emptiness throughout. 
Kohner would, of course, go on to play Sigmund’s wife in John 
Huston’s wonderful Freud (1962). 
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horror an unshakable image of Melitta Schmideberg during 
an interview he conducted with her during the 1960s: 
 
I cannot get out of my mind the picture of a small woman 
sitting in a large chair in a room darkened by thick curtains, 
and the memory also stays that throughout the interview she was 
sucking on something in her mouth that (I think) caused a 
little white drool to come down one side of her chin (p. 55).
9
  
 
I find myself peeping with dread through my fingers at 
the spectacle of Peola/Sarah Jane – who actually makes it 
– unlike Schmideberg – to her mother’s funeral at the end 
of the film for one final display of flailing psychic 
agony. Confronted with an image of relational disaster 
that I may reasonably think I would give anything not to 
have to see, I find, in the final analysis, that the 
image turns out to be strangely worth the disturbance of 
going back to look at. But what exactly is it that I am 
going back to look at? And why do I think I can find it 
in a film’s half-moving image? 
                                                        
9
 Roazen (2000) paints a picture of Schmideberg as a sociopathic and 
vaguely repulsive adult baby, eventually confessing that the kindest 
thing he can say about her is that she was “mad as a hatter” (p. 56), 
elsewhere quoting an acquaintance for whom she was “straight out of a 
horror movie” (p. 55) 
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III. 
 
They look and they do not see themselves. There are consequences.  
 
So stated Winnicott (2005, p. 151) in his 
characteristically bald evocation of the mother – in 
ideal or “good enough” circumstances – functioning as a 
kind of mirror for the infant who desperately seeks out 
her gaze. Following Winnicott and his preoccupation with 
the concept of maternally-generated psychic “aliveness” 
in the infant, André Green (1983) would elaborate on the 
emotional dangers of the “dead mother” and her 
unconscious installation of unmarked, un-mourned patches 
of spectrality inside the once-alive child she never 
properly saw. Before Winnicott, of course, there was 
Ferenczi, who arrived at – often attacked or ignored – 
conceptualizations of an infant’s dissociative 
development of internally distorted parental images when 
attacked or ignored by his or her actual caregivers to a 
point beyond the tolerable.
10
 All these clinicians, in 
                                                        
10
 As is well-documented (e.g. Judith Dupont’s introduction to 
Ferenczi, 1995), Freud strongly disapproved of the once-loyal 
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their different ways, describe a world in which 
vulnerable humans, affected by the way they are looked at 
or not looked at, generate or fail to generate images of 
relationality with which they can give meaning to the 
world. But in what sense might the kinds of filmic images 
I have been discussing contribute to the creation of new 
meaning for the spectator?   
For Jean Knox (2004), influenced both by the early 
object-relations theorists and by the attachment concepts 
of Bowlby, Ainsworth and Main, makes a crucial move in 
her further incorporation of the Jungian idea of the 
archetype into her exploration of an infant’s early 
experience of his or her primary caregiver and the 
relationship they have together. Problematizing the 
notion of the archetype as a somehow naturally occurring 
imago within the human mind, Knox instead argues for a 
rethinking of the child’s development of unconscious 
archetypes as the culmination of internalized emotional 
interactions with the first human being s/he knows. These 
                                                                                                                                                               
Ferenczi’s return to a radically revitalized, literally mind-
expanding theory of child sexual assault, and sought to stop his own 
rebel analyst “baby” delivering his landmark 1933 “Confusion of 
Tongues” paper (Ferenczi, 1949).   
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interactions come, eventually, to be symbolized through 
what Knox calls “image schemas”: 
 
Whilst image schemas are without symbolic content in 
themselves, they provide a reliable scaffolding on which 
meaningful imagery and thought is organized and constructed, 
thus meeting the need for a model that provides for the arche- 
type-as-such and the archetypal image. If we adopt this model 
for archetypes, we have to discard the view that they are 
genetically inherited and consider them to be reliably repeated 
early developmental achievements (p. 9).      
 
For Knox, one of the principal aims of psychotherapy is 
to work directly with a patient’s internalized image 
schemas, seeking to  
 
allo[w] knowledge to become increasingly accessible to 
different parts of the cognitive system, so that consciousness 
itself can be seen to be an emergent property of the constantly 
reiterated process of representational re-description” (p. 10).   
 
By helping to “representationally re-describe” those 
aspects of their patients’ internal worlds which have 
hitherto not had adequate representation via the early 
development of symbol-promoting image schemas, the 
psychotherapist collaborates in the re-establishment in 
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the patient of “reflective function”, that capacity, 
first elaborated by Fonagy and Target (1997) to conceive 
of both oneself and other people as having a mind, as 
experiencing emotion, as actually being real. 
 I am not arguing that the “half-moving” images – 
fantasized, filmed, or both – which I have been 
discussing so far perform the same reparative function as 
psychotherapy. Movies are not actual people; they do not 
provide the spectator with a real, reciprocal, human 
relationship (although neither, it might be argued, does 
psychotherapy, at least not as it is classically 
conceived; Ferenczi [1995] made that point in his soul-
searching clinical diary of 1932-3). But I do believe 
that what these “half-moving” images offer, from Main’s 
videotapes to cinema’s “melo-horror”, are freshly 
representational frames in which to feel, symbolize and, 
perhaps for the first time, see the repressed shards of 
our own disorganized relationality. Within these new – 
Jung might say “transcendent” – mirrors of unprocessed 
attachment-trauma, it is not the human beings in front of 
the camera but rather those who are truly looking at them 
who may have the chance to reconfigure themselves 
internally, if they can bring themselves to be moved by 
this series of symbolizing gestures. When, in the 1934 
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version of Imitation of Life, Peola sees her pale image 
in a mirror and exclaims to her bemused Black mother, 
“I’m White!”, she appeals to a register of perception 
that is anything but emotionally reflective. In Sirk’s 
1959 remake, Sarah Jane repeats even more spectacularly 
Peola’s vain attempt to gain confirmation of her 
discombobulated sense of self, in the form of 
genuflection before a set of pornographizing gazes that 
are constitutionally incapable of offering anything close 
to what Knox would describe as truly reflective function. 
But what about us, the spectators who watch these 
characters in a range of “strange situations”? What does 
our gaze do with their flailing performances of un-
mirrored distress?  
I think that Sirk offers us something of a blueprint 
for a different kind of gazing experience, one capable of 
transforming the un-metabolized affect of infantile 
disorientation into something potentially nurturing and 
generative of emotional thought, in the remarkable final 
funeral sequence of his version of Imitation. Here we 
have the child Sarah Jane and the mother Annie reunited 
for one last “strange situation”, Sarah Jane behaving in 
characteristically disorganized fashion as she bursts 
onto the horrified scene outside the church to wrestle 
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with her dead mother’s coffin. But there is something 
different about the way in which this final scene of 
relational disorganization gets looked at, both for the 
intra-diegetic spectators and, I would argue, for the 
spectators of the film itself.  
For once, we have the impression that the witnesses 
of the uncanny parent-child reunion are seeing something 
that they have hitherto not allowed themselves to see. 
Lora and Susie, the blondly, blandly “untraumatized” 
mother-daughter pair, have shifted both psychically and 
physically far enough at this stage to enter into an 
almost entirely Black space, one which, to cap it all, is 
filled with the shockingly alive voice and face of 
Mahalia Jackson singing “Trouble in the World”. There is 
something utterly unexpected about these sounds and 
images of collective Black life and mourning in the final 
moments of a melodrama in which the bleeding wounds of 
disrupted Black kinship have been blanked out time and 
again: they erupt into the hitherto “sanitized” White 
space of the film as visual archetypes of something 
fantastically fresh and containing.
11
 The singer, the 
                                                        
11
 I still find these images of Lana Turner and Sandra Dee, in humbly 
integrated attendance at this beautiful, Black, pre-Civil Rights 
funeral, weirdly shocking. 
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mourners, Lora, Susie and the spectator are united in 
gazing at what remains of a truly dead mother’s 
bewildering interactions with her exploding child. The 
spectacle of derangement is sequentially linked to 
something that I would venture to call filmically-
generated rapture. What I am trying to describe with this 
term is the kind of seismic internal shift I feel when I 
allow myself to gaze on a filmed image of relationality 
that is simultaneously disturbing and transcendent and, 
instead of turning away, am able, somehow, to experience 
a kind of insight into how that image of disturbance may 
be representationally re-described and met; what kind of 
unspoken horror it may audio-visually symbolize; and how 
my own developmental features and deficits, both 
conscious and unconscious, may be connected to that 
symbolization.  
In the concluding sections of this article, I shall 
explore what two other “half-moving” images of cinematic 
melo-horror may be able to achieve when they are able to 
“representationally re-describe” a set of traumatized 
image schemas and archetypes that have – like that 
patient Jung famously evoked at his London lecture of 
1935 attended by Bion and Beckett – never been properly 
born. 
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IV. 
 
Thirty seconds after you’re born you have a past. And sixty seconds 
after that, you begin to lie to yourself about it.  
 
This sobering statement is uttered by the inebriated 
character of Juliana Kelly in David Cronenberg’s film The 
Brood (1979), in a somewhat insightful, yet at the same 
time woefully decontextualized, analysis of her 
relationship with her disturbed adult daughter Nola. It 
is a saw worthy of Klein at her best and worst.
12
 Five 
minutes later, Juliana will be bludgeoned to death by 
what looks like a tiny, ugly infant. The creature is 
actually not a human child, we discover towards the end 
of the film, but rather one of a huge “brood” of 
psychically generated entities that Nola has grown, one 
by one, in a sort of exo-womb that hangs outside her 
abdomen. Nola’s capacity for this kind of asexual 
                                                        
12
 One can only speculate as to whether Cronenberg consciously meant 
to evoke Klein. Later in the film we do see posters of Laing and 
Reich in Nola’s former apartment, and of course Cronenberg went on to 
make the Freud-Jung-Spielrein-themed movie A Dangerous Method (2011), 
so clearly the actual figures of psychoanalysis are of no small 
interest to him. 
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reproduction has been stimulated by her psychotherapy 
sessions with the maverick clinician Hal Raglan, pioneer 
of “psychoplasmics” at his residential treatment centre, 
“Somafree”, where Raglan encourages all his patients to 
symbolize the unprocessed affect of their childhood 
trauma (Nola claims to have been severely abused by her 
mother and betrayed by her father) in the form of bodily 
growths. Nola is Raglan’s most spectacularly performing 
case (the “queen bee”, as Mike, an envious fellow-patient 
puts it): her fantastical brood ends up killing both her 
parents, as well as her estranged husband Frank’s 
potential new girlfriend, Ruth. When the creatures abduct 
Frank’s and Nola’s 5-year-old daughter Candice, Frank is 
forced to confront Nola at Somafree, where she 
triumphantly shows him her exo-womb, and delivers her 
latest brood-baby; Frank looks on aghast. Horrified, he 
strangles Nola, but not before the brood beat Raglan to 
death in the shed outside, leaving little Candice (who 
has witnessed this murder, and is herself now showing 
signs of involuntary somatization in the form of weeping 
tumours) in a state of dead-eyed catatonia. 
 Not enough has been written about this remarkable 
film, perhaps Cronenberg’s finest work, but I shall 
restrict my analysis of it here to underlining its 
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utterly uncompromising exploration of what it might mean, 
in psycho-cultural terms, truly to look at the 
disorganized and “unthinkable” materialization-
performance of the internalized relational traumata of 
infancy. In the space between declaring her theory of the 
mendacious baby and experiencing her own fantastical 
murder by her daughter’s “new flesh”, Juliana beholds the 
creature that has recently emerged from her daughter’s 
“psychoplasmic” therapy. She is given no choice. Nola’s 
supernatural trauma-baby (Juliana’s pseudo-grandchild) 
defiantly presents itself for viewing, refusing to submit 
itself to its grandmother’s analysis, Kleinian or 
otherwise. All it is, the moment before it kills Juliana, 
is her non-negotiable vision – at last – of her adult 
daughter’s tangled-up insides. You will look at this, 
even if it’s the last thing you do – this is the 
desperate communication Cronenberg’s film seems visually 
to enact for its squirming and discomfited spectator, not 
in the usual horror-spirit of gratuitous sadism, but 
rather with an emotional earnestness that is, in its way, 
as melodramatically heartrending as vintage Sirk. The 
fantastical “infants” at the heart of the film make for 
some of cinema’s most preposterous images. Watching The 
Brood is a truly bizarre cultural experience – the 
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creatures are simultaneously hilarious (in their cute 
little snow-suits) and bloodily terrifying; the 
disoriented spectator starts to feel like that toddler in 
Main’s video, the one whose mouth managed to turn up and 
down at the same time. But in their uncompromising 
monstrousness, Cronenberg’s brood (and the 
“psychoplasmics” project generally, such as it is given 
form onscreen) represent a radical filmic response to an 
ethical challenge, the very challenge with which Ferenczi 
(1949) presented an unforgiving Freud via his “Confusion 
of Tongues” heresy: how does a responsible adult – 
psychotherapist, filmmaker, caregiver or anyone else – 
facilitate the symbolization of a traumatized subject’s 
internalized relationships, strange psychic fruit, 
perhaps, but the fruit, nevertheless, of real 
interactions that have been scrupulously hidden from view 
or simply, mysteriously, never really seen? 
 Nola’s therapy scenes with Raglan, in which he 
“therapeutically” plays her daughter, her mother, her 
father and her rival, and she plays herself in various 
states of development, are excruciating. When I watch 
them, I feel swirling combinations of embarrassment, 
fear, amusement, rage. I do not feel emotionally 
“organized”. The second of these three scenes, occurring 
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roughly a third of the way through the film, is a 
dialogue between Nola and Raglan-as-Daddy which 
encapsulates the central problematic of the film and its 
indigestible images. The “child” Nola reproaches her 
“good” parent for not seeing what screamed to be seen: 
“You shouldn’t have looked away when she hit me. […] You 
pretended it wasn’t happening. You looked away. Didn’t 
you love me?” This is the obsession that drives the 
“madness” (embodied in Nola) at the heart of The Brood, 
just as, in a very different context, it is the obsession 
that drives the madness (embodied in Peola/Sarah Jane) at 
the heart of Imitation of Life: how do we generate images 
equal to the representation of an affliction which has 
not been recognized and which has accordingly mutated 
into something beyond recognition? And, even if we manage 
such a feat, how do we expect our spectator to respond to 
the image we have created?
13
  
                                                        
13
 Cronenberg repeats this question in truly astonishing form in his 
recent Maps to the Stars (2014), in which Julianne Moore’s film star 
character is repeatedly mocked and confronted by the ghost of the 
dead film star mother she believes sexually assaulted her in 
childhood. The scenes of their “dialogues” are amongst the most 
disturbing I have ever witnessed in the cinema, while Moore’s 
character’s decision to play her mother’s role in a remake of an old 
classic reflects a Sarah Jane-like shallowness of vision in its 
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In the film’s denouement, just before the 
spectacular lifting of skirts and revelation of the exo-
womb, Nola mockingly questions Frank – and implicitly the 
spectator – as to his seriousness about really wanting to 
accompany her on her radically subjective journey into 
self-knowledge and expression. His protestations of 
sincerity (he is merely playing for time) are a parody of 
hollow platitudes: “Show me! Educate me! Involve me! I 
wasn’t ready before but I’m ready now […] I want to go 
with you wherever you go.” When Nola responds, her eyes 
large and knowing – “Do you? Do you? – we realize, just 
as Frank realizes, that she is about to show us – “Then 
look!” – something that will challenge to its very core 
our ability to truly look. Like Nola’s father, we may 
turn away from Nola at precisely the moment she most 
needs us to see her. Nola  nevertheless persists in her 
request for witnessing, even at the cost of her own 
destruction (and Frank will promptly strangle her). 
Cronenberg’s camera refuses to turn away from the 
abdomen, its fantastical growth, its infant product. And 
since that camera’s gaze not only remains steady but also 
                                                                                                                                                               
spectacularized collusion with – as opposed to transcendent use of – 
the screen/mirror of trauma. 
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records what it sees, Nola’s extraordinary cinematic and 
emotional revelation is kept intact for us until we are 
ready to see it. We may never be ready, of course – at 
least, not until we grow a new pair of eyes.
14
  
 
 
V. 
 
 
I want to conclude this exploratory survey of cinema’s 
“un-born attachments” by focusing on a set of uncannily 
moving images of a mother and her disoriented, un-dead 
child which, despite being directed by a high-profile 
filmmaker (Jonathan Demme), despite featuring one of the 
most successful entertainers in the Western world (Oprah 
Winfrey), and despite being adapted from the work of one 
of the most highly-lauded writers of recent times (Toni 
Morrison), remain obscure and largely unseen. The film 
Beloved (1998) is a strangely neglected cultural object: 
shallowly bathed in arms-length tepidity upon its 
release, it has subsequently sunk into a shadowy, near-
                                                        
14
 A colleague who recently taught the film told me that some 
students reported having been made emotionally and even physically 
ill by this scene. 
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invisible critical oblivion. My intention here is to take 
a long, hard look at some of these images which have been 
deemed so apparently unworthy of serious contemplation. 
My unprovable suspicion is that contemporary culture has 
averted its embarrassed gaze from this extraordinary film 
(whilst – rightly – holding up the original novel as a 
“classic”) in much the same way as the mortified White 
mother Bea/Lora of Imitation of Life could not bear to 
take in the visual spectacle of Peola/Sarah Jane’s 
frenzied demands for psycho-social metamorphosis, and 
just as Frank felt compelled to cover his eyes upon 
beholding Nola’s monstrous exo-womb. Utterly beyond the 
categorizations of either family melodrama or horror, yet 
inextricably bound up in both genres, Beloved is a 
bizarre cinematic descendant of both Imitation and The 
Brood, featuring an adult-child protagonist (“Beloved”) 
who emerges from a womb of total (racialized) trauma, 
passes into a crypt-like space that is neither life nor 
death, and demands, in a series of almost unbelievably 
disturbing audio-visual displays, to be seen in all her 
“un-born” distress. 
Morrison’s original story was, as is well known, 
inspired by the real figure of a reluctantly infanticidal 
nineteenth-century mother. Sethe, formerly enslaved at a 
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plantation known as “Sweet Home”, lives with her daughter 
Denver at 124 Bluestone Rd, a house that is haunted by 
some kind of thoroughly disturbed spirit. Sethe’s young 
sons Howard and Bugler have already taken flight in 
terror of the ghost, and her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs, 
has died. When Paul D., Sethe’s former friend from Sweet 
Home (where he was also enslaved), turns up at “124” 
after years of wandering, the two begin a tentative 
sexual relationship, and Paul D. is able to dismiss the 
ghost. Shortly afterwards, upon returning from the fair, 
Sethe, Denver and Paul D. encounter an outlandish, 
infantile young woman, barely capable of speech or 
movement, known only by the name “Beloved”. They take her 
in and help her to develop. Denver realizes that Beloved 
is a form of her long-dead older sister, who apparently 
died in babyhood; meanwhile Paul D. discovers that Sethe 
killed that baby (and would have killed the others and 
herself too) in an attempt to prevent them all from being 
taken back into slavery at Sweet Home, following a recent 
escape. Paul D. leaves “124”, having gravely offended 
Sethe with his reminder that she has “two legs, not 
four”, trying hard also to forget the one terrible, 
sexual night he spent in the outhouse with Beloved, who 
demanded of him that he “touch [her] on the inside part”. 
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The three women, Sethe, Denver and Beloved, drift into a 
state of wretchedness, as Sethe, having finally realized 
Beloved’s identity, wears herself out in trying to make 
amends before her now despotic ghoul of a dead daughter. 
Driven by the fresh madness of Beloved and Sethe into the 
world outside “124” for the first time in her life, 
Denver brings help in the form of a local group of Black 
women, who succeed, via collective spiritual effort, in 
drawing a heavily pregnant, naked Beloved out of the 
house and causing her at last to vanish. 
The filmed version of Beloved is without doubt one 
of the most truly revelational films my eyes have ever 
been offered, managing the rare cinematic feat of 
translating into transformational visions “crypt-like” 
relational dynamics that had been evoked ten years 
earlier in a prose which many had assumed to be un-
filmable. My goal here – beyond registering the fact that 
the filmed images of the movie (more so even than the 
language of the book) helped me to make conscious, via 
extraordinary symbolization, aspects of my own 
internalized relations that I had hitherto repressed into 
deadened oblivion – is to highlight some of the key ways 
in which Demme’s film uses specifically visual and eye-
oriented techniques to effect a kind of emotional 
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movement in the spectator that seems to me not unrelated 
to “reflective function” such as it is described by Knox 
(2004). 
Most obviously, by turning Morrison’s often 
fantastical words into images, Demme dares to conjure up 
on camera aspects of psychic experience and traumatic 
relationality that emerge from a place of radical, pre-
symbolic interiority. When Morrison tells us, improbably, 
that the shadows of Denver, Sethe and Paul D. were 
holding hands even though they themselves were not, Demme 
does not hesitate to create that impossible image: the 
effect is breathtakingly emotional, as we see the 
existence of a realm of nascent psychic attachments that 
the intra-diegetic spectators of the trio cannot. Sethe’s 
and Paul D.’s traumatic dreams of Sweet Home are 
projected as horrendous visual images onto the walls of 
Sethe’s bedroom as the new couple sleep, while, most 
stunning of all, the once-invisible “ghost” of Beloved is 
given flesh in the filmed person of the performer Thandie 
Newton. The impact of Newton’s disturbing, outrageously 
materialized performance on the viewer’s already over-
stimulated senses is hard to overstate. It belongs to a 
small category of deranged filmic performance in which 
the actor manages to convey a kind of internal chaos that 
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is beyond mere madness, but which evokes a realm of 
almost ontological disorientation.
15
 As the stammering, 
drooling, sexualized infant-revenant Beloved, Newton is 
both somehow embarrassing (not unlike Samantha Eggar as 
Nola at certain moments of The Brood) – one wants to turn 
away from the affect she visually and sonically produces 
– and sublime. There is something about the way she acts 
that feels unbearable. As Ellen C. Scott (2004) puts it,    
  
Beloved is in a sense the definition of a spectacle – and not 
only because she hold our optical attention.  For spectators 
within and outside of the narrative alike, Beloved defies both 
paradigm and categorization: our eyes don’t know what to do 
with her. 
 
But what I find most truly fascinating about Newton-as-
Beloved is the way in which she is created by Demme’s 
camera as a being that is both incapable of being looked 
at and which – like Winnicott’s “un-mirrored” baby, like 
Imitation’s Peola and Sarah Jane, and like Melanie 
Klein’s adult daughter Melitta Schmideberg (if we believe 
                                                        
15
 Some other performances I would put in this category are Sissy 
Spacek’s in Altman’s 3 Women (1977); Isabelle Adjani’s in Zulawski’s 
Possession (1981); Lisa Gay Hamilton’s (who, coincidentally, plays 
the young Sethe in Beloved) in Rodrigo Garcia’s Nine Lives (2005).  
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Roazen’s (2000) account of her quasi-pathological anti-
relationality) – is itself incapable of looking.16 
 “I came back to see her face,” Beloved tells Denver 
in a scene roughly a third of the way into the film 
which, not unlike the therapy dialogue between Nola and 
Raglan a third of the way into The Brood, explores the 
problem of not looking, but with an even more heightened 
intensity. The two sisters, one alive, one un-dead, are 
questioning each other about their origins. As Denver, 
played by Kimberley Elise, begins to realize who Beloved 
actually is, we see her unusually expressive eyes fill 
with tears as she gazes at her rediscovered sibling with 
incredulous, incredible love. As I watch Denver watching 
Beloved – no matter how many times I see the film – and 
as I observe the quality of her gaze shifting into 
something so radically object-seeking and relational, I 
find myself starting to weep. What Demme’s camera 
captures, and what Elise’s face performs, is a 
recognition that feels ineffable.
17
 It is all the more 
                                                        
16
 As Winnicott (2005) puts it: “When I look I am seen, so I exist. I 
can now afford to look and see” (p. 154). It becomes increasingly, 
disturbingly apparent in the course of this film that Beloved cannot 
“afford” to look or see anyone or anything other than her own fantasy 
of the lost/murderous mother Sethe.  
17
 Elise states (quoted in Fischerova, 2006): “I had to communicate 
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startling, contrasted, as it is, in a series of close-up 
shot-reverse shots, with Newton’s blank, hard gaze. 
Beloved seeks only information about the origins of 
attachment; when it comes to experiencing attachment to 
her rediscovered objects in this, perhaps the strangest 
“strange situation” imaginable, she veers, like the most 
disturbing of Main’s videotaped infants, from freezing to 
slapping to a positively unending grimace of…something. 
Beloved’s eyes – Newton’s eyes – remain uncannily bright 
and distant throughout the dialogue with Denver, 
seemingly hungry, but not for anything that her sister 
can offer. The creature claims that what she seeks is the 
regained vision of their mother’s face; but the spectator 
knows in the moment of horrible immersion in that gaze of 
radical hardness that it is far too late for that. Like 
Nola’s brood, like Peola and Sarah Jane, Beloved is a 
strange embodiment of traumatized attachment-obsession 
that is at the same time uncannily indifferent to 
anything that is recognizable as actually functioning 
attachment.  
                                                                                                                                                               
the character non-verbally. I felt that the less I said with words 
and the more I said with face and eyes and body, the more true it 
would be to Denver’s character” (p. 37). 
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It seems to me that the film challenges and 
encourages the spectator to look at Beloved in a way that 
she herself cannot manage to look: in the place of eyes 
of shame, we are invited to grow eyes of love.
18
 When, in 
the film’s almost intolerable denouement, the naked, 
swollen-bellied Beloved emerges from the front door of 
“124” to meet the horrified gaze of the singing Black 
women, Nola’s challenge to Frank – “Then look!” – at the 
conclusion of The Brood is repeated at a collective 
level. The spectator, allied with the singing women (of 
whom Thelma Houston, the legendary performer of the 
aptly-titled “Don’t Leave Me This Way”, is one – 
reminding us of Sirk’s startling, intermedial use of 
Mahalia Jackson at the end of Imitation), must force him 
or herself to look at the embarrassing spectral image 
lolling with its unhinged mother on the porch, just as 
Main was duty-bound to keep on looking at those 
uncategorizable videotapes of infants and their 
rediscovered caregivers behaving in such strange and 
perturbing ways. For it is in our continued gaze, despite 
enormous discomfort, Demme’s camera implies, that 
                                                        
18
 For a wonderful – and comprehensive – account of the 
therapeutically transformational role of loving eyes on “un-mirrored” 
patients, see Ayers (2003). 
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something resembling real change can take place. A rich, 
local White man, Mr Bodwin, is also present at the public 
revelation of Beloved. He appears to see what the 
spectator and the singing women see, but his gaze, like 
Frank’s at the end of The Brood, is horrifed and 
rejecting. What will he remember of the sight of Beloved? 
What will he actually take in? What will Lora and Susie 
retain of the sight of Sarah Jane and Mahalia Jackson at 
Annie’s funeral at the end of Imitation?  
And what about us? What can we conceivably take in, 
retain and use, consciously or unconsciously, from these 
half-moving images of disorienting melo-horror? As if 
trying to help us to use what we have witnessed within a 
context of ultimately nurturing containment rather than 
total trauma, Beloved will close with a visual reminder 
of the uber-parental gaze of the long-dead Baby Suggs, 
played by legendary African-American actress Beah 
Richards, preaching to a group of formerly enslaved 
children and adults in a clearing in the woods near her 
home. “Love your hearts!” she declaims. In an earlier 
flashback to similar scenes of pastoral bliss presided 
over by Baby Suggs, Beloved’s gaze at the scene evoked 
remains blank and uncomprehending. It seems to me, 
however, that this film does not fix us in the position 
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of its spectral, unseeing, un-born child, any more than 
Imitation of Life or The Brood does. All three films 
encourage us to go further, much further, than the 
reluctant, frequently disavowing witnesses, Mr Bodwin, 
“Miss” Lora and Frank. They take us to a place where, 
perhaps, we can at last look again at Melitta 
Schmideberg’s red boots – and even at her “devilish” 
drool – and not only “blow up” these disorientingly 
moving images, but reflect them, love them too.       
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